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I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of environmental law is dynamic and exciting
to many of us who have chosen the law as our profession.
Environmental law also poses many opportunities, even for the
most skilled practitioners, to commit malpractice. The very
qualities that make the practice of environmental law
174 [Vol. 33:173
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stimulating-rapid change, complex policy and regulatory is-
sues, open-ended questions of interpretation, and high stakes
liabilities-also add substantial risk to the unwary practitioner.
Still in its youth compared to many other fields of law, the
growing pains (some would say psychoses) of environmental
law lead to rapidly evolving standards of what is expected of
attorneys in terms of knowledge and practice skills. Clients,
dazed by the changing and complex features of environmental
regulations, often ask much, perhaps too much, of their attor-
neys: clients want clear assessments and predictions concern-
ing their past, current, and prospective compliance; they want
definitive answers concerning liability exposure for potential
violations; and they want sure outcomes in government en-
forcement actions and other litigation settings. While such
client desires also pervade other areas of law, the pace of
change and level of complexity in environmental regulation can
make today's legal answer tomorrow's blunder, often with no
advance warning. This situation provides the ingredients for
malpractice claims.1
Few statutes could illustrate this point better than the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) - and the confusion (some say may-
hem) it has caused under its liability scheme. That law,
1. Legal malpractice claims concern the quality of legal services and conduct
of an attorney. See AMERICAN BAR ASSN STANDING COmM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSION-
AL LIAB., THE LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO LEGAL LLPRACTICE 4 (1992) [hereinafter
DEsK GUIDE]. A prima facie case of legal malpractice requires the plaintiff to prove:
(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship that gives rise to a duty the at-
torney owes to the client; (2) an act or omission by the attorney in breach of the
duty owed; (3) injury suffered by the client; and (4) a proximate causal relationship
between the attorney's breach of duty and the injury suffered by the client. Id. at 4-
5. Those elements, in one form or another, may surface in three distinct causes of
action available to clients for incompetent representation by their attorneys: (1)
breach of fiduciary duty;, (2) breach of contract; and (3) the tort of malpractice. Roy
R. Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer
on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 235 (1994). The purpose of
this Article is to define the degree to which environmental law practice presents a
heightened exposure to malpractice claims because of special characteristics of the
subject matter, administration, and practice of environmental law. Accordingly, this
Article does not review the rudimentary elements of legal malpractice claims. Nor
does this Article describe the common sources and "pitalls" of malpractice experi-
enced by practitioners generally or the procedures and "tips7 that an attorney might
follow to avoid liability. For a thorough bibliography of materials addressing such
issues on a general level, see DESK GUIDE, supra, at 252-57.
2. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). For a comprehensive overview of CERCLA
law and procedure, see generally ALFRED E. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE
(1991) and ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFuND LAW AND PROCEDURE
(1992).
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slapped together during the last days of the Carter Adminis-
tration,3 contains virtually no textual guidance about the scope
of provisions dealing with who may be liable for remediation
when hazardous substances have been released into the envi-
ronment. Thus, Congress has left the courts to decide such is-
sues, including retroactivity and the liability of successor corpo-
rations, dissolved corporations, bankrupt parties, lenders, es-
tates, trustees, and other parties not obviously liable under the
statute.4 Given the massive liabilities at stake, entities that
have been sued as potentially responsible for remediation costs
have fought hard, and the legal community has seen a verita-
ble tsunami of litigation and regulation focused on the scope of
liability under CERCLA' Decisions interpreting the statute
have emerged from federal courts around the nation, with less
than uniform results. While the precise forms of litigation have
changed over the years, the pace of litigation defining liability
and procedure under CERCLA has not slowed in the 1990s.6
Despite such rapidly changing horizons, and almost with-
out regard to the risks involved for their attorneys, clients
have demanded reliable legal opinions on environmental law
questions, and attorneys have tried their best to deliver. Along
the way, many malpractice land mines have been dropped,
waiting, perhaps, to be triggered by the next unforeseen7 in-
terpretation of the law or other turn of events. CERCLA may
be an extreme case in this regard, but among environmental
laws it is not alone in posing substantial malpractice risks to
practitioners.
3. See LIGHT, supra note 2, at 12-18.
4. See generally id. at 94-122.
5. Each year the Hazardous and Solid Waste Committee of the American Bar
Association's Section on Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law
(SONREEL) contributes a survey of cases decided under CERCLA to the Section's
annual law survey. The discussion of CERCLA case law in the 1988 volume spanned
36 pages, the longest segment devoted to any single statute. See SECTION OF NAT-
URAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSN & THE NAT'L ENER-
GY LAW & POLICY INST., UNIVERSITY OF TULSA COLLEGE OF LAW, NATURAL RESOURC-
ES, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 1988-THE YEAR IN REVIEW 174-210 (1989).
6. SONREEL's 1994 review of CERCLA litigation spanned 35 pages in its
annual law survey, once again making it the longest segment devoted to any one
statute. See SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N & NAT'L ENERGY-ENV'T LAW & POLICY INST., UNIVERSITY OF TULSA COL-
LEGE OF LAW, NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 1994-THE
YEAR IN REVIEW 193-228 (1995). CERCLA's liability issues appear to go around in
circles and are never confidently resolved. Refer to subpart If(B) infra.
7. Of course, whether or not the adverse consequences of an attorney's actions
were foreseeable goes to the very heart of malpractice liability. Refer to notes 93,
115 infra and accompanying text (discussing the role of foreseeability in malpractice
in the tax and securities arenas).
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The jury is still out, however, as to whether these risks
will materialize. While the consensus of opinion is that envi-
ronmental law poses thorny professional responsibility' and
attorney liability' issues, there is considerable debate about
whether the characteristics of environmental law present a
heightened risk of malpractice liability exposure for environ-
mental attorneys." On the one hand, the number of malprac-
tice claims involving environmental law representation and the
number of reported decisions addressing environmental mal-
practice liability are insignificant when compared to other legal
practice fields." Environmental law is an even more
8. Attorney conflict of interest issues often arise in connection with CERCLA
sites involving numerous potentially responsible parties, either when a number of
parties attempt to hire common counsel or when an attorney hired by one party at
the site has represented other parties in similar contexts. See Patrick E. Donovan,
Serving Multiple Masters: Confronting the Conflicting Interests That Arise in
Superfund Disputes, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 371, 372 (1990); Richard H.
Krochock & Deborah C. Eckland, Conflicts of Interest in the Handling of Waste Dis.
posal Cases, FOR THE DEF., Jan. 1993, at 11, 11; see also State Bar of Mich. Stand-
ing Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. No. R-16, Nov. 19, 1993, at *4,
5, available in WESTLAW, MIETH-EO database (noting that a lawyer ethically may
represent multiple potentially responsible parties at a single superfund site, provided
that a disinterested lawyer would reasonably conclude that each clients representa-
tion will not be adversely affected by the multiple representation, and that each
client consents after full disclosure and consultation). The requirement that lawyers
maintain client confidences can also put environmental law practitioners under pres-
sure when doing so jeopardizes public health or environmental integrity. See Ted A.
Warpinski, An Essay on Environmental Law and Ethics, BARRIsER, Fall 1991, at
41, 43.
9. Attorneys acting as estate trustees may be personally liable for the deci-
sions they make with regard to estate assets and operations if those decisions lead
to the release of hazardous substances. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs.
Co., 827 F. Supp. 600, 605 (D. Ariz. 1993) ("i1f a trustee has control over trust
property, and knowingly allows it to be used for the disposal of hazardous substanc-
es, then it is the trustee who is responsible for the decision to use the property for
an ultrahazardous activity."); see also Elayne Betensky, Trustee CERCLA Liability:
An Undefined Standard, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL L. & POLI 87, 126 (1995) (noting that
the courts have not uniformly imposed CERCLA liability on trustees and concluding
that the better rule is not to presume that trustees are the owners of CERCLA sites
and therefore are not liable); James R. Arnold & Gerald J. Buchwald,
Superfund=Superliability, A.B.A J., Sept. 1993, at 117, 117 (noting that a lawyer
who comes into possession of contaminated property as a trustee may be held liable
as an owner or operator, even if the pollution predated the lawyer's service). In
some cases, attorneys have been sued for direct liability, though never successfully,
merely for giving legal advice to clients who later, acting on that advice, caused
environmental damage to third parties. See, e.g., City of N. Miami v. Berger, 828 F.
Supp. 401, 412 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding that a corporation's attorney could not "be
deemed to have possessed the requisite authority to control the landfill that would
subject him to CERCLA liability as an operator").
10. See Thom Weidlich, Will Environmental Law Be a Malpractice Trap?, NATL,
L.J., June 13, 1994, at A26.
11. The American Bar Associations Standing Committee on Lawyers' Profes-
sional Liability and the National Legal Malpractice Data Center tracked malpractice
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insignificant category in terms of the dollar amount of claims
paid to malpractice claimants. 2 Thus, history suggests that
environmental attorneys face no unusual or special malpractice
threats.
On the other hand, environmental law indisputably impos-
es potentially high liabilities and expensive regulatory burdens
for attorneys' clients, a condition that could lead to a spillover
effect upon attorneys when clients stung by environmental lia-
bility and regulatory entanglements take issue with their
attorneys' performance. As a number of legal practitioners and
malpractice insurers have proposed, this may suggest that mal-
practice claims statistics do not fully reveal the latent potential
for environmental malpractice exposure. 3  Indeed,
claims filed nationally from 1980 through 1985. See STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL LIAB., AMERICAN BAR ASSN, CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA CENTER at vii (1989)
[hereinafter CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE]. Of the over 29,000 claims
occurring from January 1, 1983 through September 30, 1985, 62 were categorized as
involving natural resources law as the substance of the professional services, and 31
as involving environmental law. See id. at xi, 10 tbl. 4. Arguably, the ABA's data do
not fully reflect the current degree of malpractice exposure because environmental
law has expanded considerably in scope and complexity since 1985, thus potentially
increasing the malpractice risk. More current data, however, indicate no increase in
claims exposure since 1985. For example, the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society
(ALAS), a legal malpractice self-insurance entity that insures over 345 major law
firms and over 47,000 attorneys, does not even list environmental law as one of its
categories of malpractice claims experience, relegating it to the "other" category that
accounts for an aggregate of two percent of total claims. See ATTORNEYS' LIABILITY
ASSURANCE SOCIETY, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 18 (1995) (on file with the Houston
Law Review). The number of reported cases dealing with environmental law malprac-
tice reflects the low number of claims. Refer to text accompanying notes 81-85 infra.
12. The combined categories of natural resources law and environmental law
accounted for only 0.5% of the total dollars paid to malpractice claimants during the
ABA's 1980-85 period. See CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 11,
at 71 tbl. 38.
13. Commentary on malpractice exposure in environmental law is nascent,
limited mainly to legal seminar papers, law practice journals, and legal malpractice
insurer newsletters; these sources are in general agreement, though, that the poten-
tial for a wave of claims is not to be overlooked. See, e.g., James R. Arnold & Ger-
ald J. Buchwald, After the S & L Crisis: Are Environmental Lawyers Next?, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE REV., Spring 1994, at 3, 3 ("If liability claims against environmental
lawyers are the coming wave, it has not hit, not yet at least."); William Freivogel,
Lawyer Liability in Environmental Practice, ALAS LOSS PREVENTION J., Jan. 1995,
at 2, 2 (noting that, despite the paucity of case law on environmental lawyer mal-
practice, the potential for liability exposure justifies examination); Christopher Kerns
& Scott 0. Reed, The Liability of Attorneys for Environmental Exposures, FOR THE
DEF., Apr. 1994, at 8, 10 (predicting that lawyers and law firms will be "added to
the list" of potential defendants in environmental cases); Jerry F. English, Malprac-
tice in Environmental Law, Outline of Presentation for ABA National Legal Malprac-
tice Conference 3.12 (Apr. 21-22, 1994) (on file with the Houston Law Review) ("The
complexity of environmental law .. . certainly presents ample opportunities for law-
yers to make mistakes."). Whether these sources turn out to be prescient observers
or "chicken littles" in the popular eye will depend largely on whether the wave of
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environmental law suits constitute a good number of the cur-
rently pending civil cases in federal 4 and state'6 courts, sug-
gesting that a growing number of environmental law and relat-
ed cases are in the pipeline, which could lead to malpractice
claims. As one practitioner handling environmental malpractice
claims has noted: "'Environmental [malpractice] is certainly on
everybody's lips.... The number of [environmental malprac-
tice] cases throughout the U.S. is relatively small, but the an-
tennae are very high.'" 6
Based on the premise that it is better to have those anten-
nae up rather than down, this Article explores the special
quandary of the environmental lawyer balancing the desire to
be responsive to client demands with the desire to avoid vhat-
ever heightened risk of malpractice liability might be associat-
ed with the unique characteristics of environmental law. Part
II of this Article outlines the properties of environmental law
that make it particularly susceptible to the risk of malpractice.
Most notably, the heavily regulated field of environmental law
is legally and technically complex, is rapidly changing, and
subjects violators to tremendous liabilities.
Part III explores malpractice issues in environmental law
to date. In general, specific malpractice standards have not
developed because environmental law has not been a cohesive
practice area long enough. Reported malpractice cases in the
environmental law context are few in number, but many mem-
bers of the bar believe that the potential exists for environ-
mental law to experience a surge in malpractice claims involv-
ing potentially large liability figures. If that potential becomes
a reality, it is almost certain that environmental law attorneys
would be measured against a "specialist" standard requiring a
heightened standard of care. Environmental attorneys have
specialized to a degree unmatched by most areas of legal prac-
tice, and both attorneys and consumers of legal services have
come to perceive, no doubt reasonably, that special expertise is
claims ever hits. A prudent environmental law practitioner, however, will take heed
and avoid falling into environmental law's malpractice traps. If environmental law-
yers as a class behave in that manner, out of either prudence or fear, the aggregate
claims experience may continue to be insignificant, but that will not mean the po-
tential for exposure in individual cases is also insignificant.
14. See What's Clogging the Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1995, at B5 (noting
that environmental cases are the fifth largest category of federal cases at 3.1% of
the total).
15. See Types of Tort Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1995, at B6 (noting that
cases involving claims of toxic substance exposure are 1.6% of the total, the eighth
largest category of state tort cases).
16. Weidlich, supra note 10, at A26 (quoting Thomas W. Hyland).
179
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needed to tackle environmental law problems. Those conditions
invariably will lead courts to adopt higher standards of care
for environmental practitioners. But the specific standards to
adopt are by no means clear.
Part IV explores appropriate standards of malpractice in
environmental law by analogy to more mature practice areas
that share environmental law's traits of technical complexity,
heavy regulation, constant change, high potential liabilities,
and public interest. Specifically, the discussion focuses on an
assessment of malpractice principles from tax law (for its
heavily regulated, changing, and complex qualities), patent law
(for its technical subject matter qualities), and securities law
(for its high liability exposure and public interest protection
qualities) as mediums for creating malpractice guidelines for
environmental law. Based on the lessons from other fields,
Part IV provides a summary of what standards of care can be
expected to develop for governing attorney malpractice in envi-
ronmental law matters. Although environmental law and its
malpractice jurisprudence have yet to mature, the current
measures attorneys take, if consistent with the standards de-
rived from this analysis, ultimately may protect them from
malpractice claims brought by clients with unreasonable expec-
tations.
II. THE QUAGMIRE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MALPRACTICE ABOUND
If environmental law malpractice unleashes its potential
energy, courts' and juries' perception of and response to the
special characteristics of environmental law, as well as
attorneys' response to those characteristics in practice, will
have much to do with how the prevailing malpractice princi-
ples of environmental law practice unfold. Although laws reg-
ulating practices that impact the environment have existed for
many decades, environmental law emerged as a generally rec-
oguized practice area in the United States only about twenty-
six years ago-around the time of the first Earth Day, 7 the
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),8 and
17. For a first-hand account of how Earth Day emerged in April 1970 from its
founder, Gaylord Nelson, see Milo Mason, Interview: Gaylord Nelson, 10 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1995, at 72, 72-73.
18. See President's Message to the Congress Upon Transmitting Reorganization
Plans to Establish the Two Agencies (July 9, 1970), in 6 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESI-
DENTIAL DOCUMENTS 908, 908-09 (July 13, 1970) (discussing President Nixon's reor-
ganization of the federal government's environmental and natural resource agencies
180 [Vol. 33:173
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the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).19
Environmental law has grown up fast and, at least from a
malpractice perspective, has had an undisciplined and unruly
home life. At twenty-six years of age, it has multiple personali-
ties and idiosyncracies too numerous to name. A breakthrough
in its psychotherapy is not on the horizon. Environmental
attorneys, therefore, have to be keenly aware of the problem
child they are handling.
A. Navigating the Patchwork of Environmental Laws and
Jurisdictions Is an Acquired Skill
When a client poses a legal question to an environmental
attorney, the first challenge for the attorney is determining
what laws and regulations are pertinent to the question and
who is responsible for implementation. Environmental law is
both structurally and administratively fractured-there is no
unified environmental "code" or omnibus environmental agency.
Within federal environmental law, for example, no fewer than
twenty-one laws form the core of environmental regulation,'
and over fifteen different executive branch and independent
agencies have some role in implementing one or more of those
laws.
21
Despite comprehensive, albeit cluttered, federal regulation
of the environment, preemption of state regulation is
disfavored and thus rare. Indeed, most federal statutes ex-
pressly preserve the states' powers to regulate the
environment,' and many even allow states to assume the
to consolidate implementation of environmental laws under the authority of the
EPA); see also ENvroNMNTAL LAW: FRoNi RESOURCES TO RECOVERY § L2(1)(2)
(Celia Campbell-Mohn ed., 1993) [hereinafter RESOURCES TO RECOVERY] (discussing
the formation of the EPA and the flurry of environmental statutes passed in the
early 1970s); ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ENVIRONMAL CHAN E: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE EPA 4-9 (1993) (outlining the political climate in which the EPA was created
and the EPA's early tumultuous history).
19. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4331-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). For an overview of NEPA's history and im-
plementation, see Dinah Bear, The National Environmental Policy Act: Its Origins
and Evolution, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'r, Fall 1995, at 3.
20. See FEDERAL ENviRONMENTAL LAWS 1995 (West 1995) (containing the rele-
vant provisions encompassed in the major environmental acts). Depending on how
large one draws the circle of environmental law, the number can go much higher.
Some popular treatises list dozens of federal laws by popular name as having some-
thing to do with environmental law. See, e.g., RESOURCES TO RECOVERY, supra note
18, § 4.1(3).
21. See RESOURCES TO RECOVERY, supru note 18, § 3.1(B)(3) tbl. 3-3.
22. For example, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994),
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authority to implement the federal program.23 Many states
have seized such opportunities and, to complicate matters fur-
ther, have followed the federal example by doing so through a
multitude of statutes implemented by a balkanized array of
implementing agencies."
Given the convoluted landscape of environmental laws and
jurisdictions, it is almost never intuitively obvious which laws
and agency regulations an attorney must consult in order to
address a client's inquiry. For example, an environmental prac-
titioner simply has to know that "[w]ater pollution from strip
mines is regulated by the Department of the Interior... ,
water pollution from chemical plants by the Environmental
Protection Agency . . , water pollution caused by soil erosion
by the Department of Agriculture, and water pollution caused
by road salts not at all."25 These compartmentalizations of
environmental law are learned by raw experience, not by ap-
plying common sense.
To be sure, the jumble of environmental laws and jurisdic-
tions can be learned, although many may need the crutch of
flow charts and diagrams. Indeed, once they are mastered
there is not much variation in the road map over time. Once
one learns, for example, that the National Marine Fisheries
Service handles specified marine species under the Endangered
Species Act and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
handles the rest, the rationale for the division of jurisdiction
becomes irrelevant; fortunately, this division has remained the
same for decades.26 Similarly, one simply accepts that air
emissions from hazardous waste incinerators are regulated
pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act and have been for
states that it is not to be "construed or interpreted as preempting[] the authority of
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or re-
quirements with respect to ... the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within
such State." Id. § 2718(a)(1)(A).
23. For instance, the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994),
establishes a delegation procedure for "each State desiring to administer its own
permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction." Id.
§ 1342(b).
24. See James T. Harrington, The Importance of Negotiations in Illinois Envi-
ronmental Rulemaking and Overview of the Illinois Environmental Regulatory Pro.
cess, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 531, 531 (1993) (describing the environmental regulatory
program in Illinois as a "complex array of various agencies and procedures"); see
also Chris M. Amantea & Stephen C. Jones, The Growth of Environmental Issues in
Government Contracting, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1586, 1588-89 (1994) (arguing that
the myriad comprehensive environmental laws and regulations implemented by nu-
merous agencies at the federal, state, and local levels has resulted in complex, over-
lapping environmental regulatory schemes).
25. RESOURCES TO RECOVERY, supra note 18, § 3.1, at 74 (footnotes omitted).
26. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (1994).
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many years.27 Malpractice problems could arise when one fails
to learn the puzzle or simply forgets how the pieces fit.
B. Environmental Statutes, Regulations, and Judicial and
Administrative Interpretations Thereof Evolve Rapidly and
Inconsistently
Similar to its statutory and administrative structure, the
substance of environmental law is also difficult to ascertain.
Once environmental attorneys find the right statute and agen-
cy to address a client's question, they must address the diffi-
culties in applying environmental law. Not only is the subject
matter of this body of law complex, but the substance changes
rapidly and unpredictably, making prediction of an outcome
largely a guessing game.
A classic example of the dynamic quality of environmental
law is provided by the continuing saga of what has come to be
known as "lender liability" under CEROLA.' From its incep-
tion the CERCLA statute was regarded as having the potential
for imposing sweeping liability, as it makes all present owners
and operators of facilities that release hazardous substances
liable to the federal government, states, and other entities for
the costs of remediating those conditions.' The statute de-
fines "'owner or operator" as excluding "a person[] who, with-
out participating in the management of a vessel or facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the vessel or facility."0 This "secured creditor ex-
emption" creates three ambiguities-i.e., what constitutes
"participat[ing] in management," what are "indicia of owner-
ship," and when are those indicia not held "primarily to protect
a security interest." These ambiguities imply in the negative
that a person can hold an indicia of ownership with protection
of a security interest in mind, but somehow still be considered
27. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.343 (1994).
28. The discussion that follows in the text is intended merely to illustrate the
dynamic nature of environmental law through a brief overview of the najor shifts
that have taken place with respect to the existence and scope of lender liability un-
der CERCLA. For a complete, current description of CERCLA lender liability issues,
see generally 1 ELIZABETH G. GELTMAN, ENVMOiENTAL ISSUES IN BUsINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS ch. 7 (1994); Edward B. Witte & Mark L. Prager, Environmental Lender
Liability: Searching for Safe Harbors in the Wake of Kelley v. EPA, 1 WIS. ENVTL
L.J. 1, 4 (1994) (providing practical suggestions for lenders who take or hold a secu-
rity interest in contaminated properties and wish to foreclose or transfer the proper-
ty without incurring CERCLA liability).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). For a general overview of the elements of
liability under CERCLA, see generally LIGHT, supra note 2, at 67-148.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
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an "owner or operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability be-
cause of "participat[ion] in the management" of the creditor's
activities or because the ownership was not "primarily to pro-
tect [the] security interest."3' Those possibilities captured little
attention in the lending community during the early years of
CERCLA. Yet, the government eventually began pursuing
theories of liability against lenders based on these implied
sources of liability.
The lending community's ignorance of CERCLA's applica-
tion vanished beginning with the first published decision en-
dorsing the government's theory of lender liability, the 1985
decision in United States v. Mirabile,32 which found that a
secured creditor who engages in the common lending "workout"
practice of assisting the borrower's property and business man-
agement decisions so as to avoid foreclosure can be held liable
under CERCLA if it "participatefs] in the day-to-day operation-
al aspects of the site."3 Since that case, the law of lender
liability has undergone nothing, it seems, but inconsistent
transformations. After Mirabile, the practice of foreclosure
itself fell prey to CERCLA's liability tentacles,34 an arguably
reasonable interpretation given the language of the liability
provision. However, courts were in disagreement as to what
level of involvement lenders could take in pre-foreclosure sce-
narios and still avoid CERCLA liability.35
As cases in different jurisdictions responded with different
tests, attorneys responded with advice concerning pre-loan "au-
dits" and "due diligence."" The EPA eventually offered its
"fix" in the form of a regulation outlining permissible pre- and
post-foreclosure steps a lender could take regarding manage-
ment and ownership of CERCLA sites without incurring liabili-
ty.37  That regulation provided some welcome relief by
31. Id.
32. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
33. Id. at 20,996.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,
579 (D. Md. 1986) (finding that a bank that gained ownership of a hazardous waste
disposal site through foreclosure is not exempt from liability under CERCLA).
35. Compare United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1657-58
(11th Cir. 1990) (finding that liability attaches if the secured creditor has capacity to
control operations, regardless of whether that control is exercised), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1046 (1991) with In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672-73 (9th Cir.
1990) (concluding that mere capacity to control is insufficient; actual management is
required).
36. See GELTMAN, supra note 28, § 7.12 (noting that lenders can reduce their
liabilities by making an environmental assessment of the property used as collateral
and foreclosing only after a diligent investigation of the property).
37. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1100-.1105 (1994) (Subpart L).
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establishing a uniform rule addressing liability to the federal
government, but it raised issues as to the effect of the rule in
private CERCLA cost-recovery actions and under state
remediation programs that paralleled CERCLA's secured credi-
tor provision."
Before those issues were resolved, however, the foothold
that the EPA's rule provided on the lender liability issue crum-
bled when the judiciary found that the EPA had exceeded its
rulemaking authority by proclaiming the scope of statutory
liability. 9 Since that decision, EPA rulemaking has remained
inactive, Congress has failed to pass a bill addressing the is-
sue, courts continue to refine the minutia of lender liability
under CERCLA,4 and some states have passed legislation de-
fining lender liability under state remediation law."
The point of recounting this roller-coaster history is to
illustrate the quandary of an attorney asked at any point
along the lender liability time line to opine on the CERCLA
liability consequences of a lender's pre-foreclosure actions. In
retrospect, it is easy to posit that an attorney should have
advised a lender in, say, 1981, that the statutory provision
implied the potential for lender liability, but it took five years
after the original enactment before any court addressed that
issue. In the period after Mirabile, from 1985 through 1992,
the "participation in management" source of liability was more
apparent, but its scope was neither defined nor applied uni-
formly by cases decided after Mirabile. The EPA's 1992 rule,
which solved only part of the lender liability puzzle, was alive
just less than two years, after which the world reverted back
to Mirabile and its confused progeny. Depending on the juris-
diction, therefore, it is entirely possible that the same set of
38. See Louis S. Zimmerman & Janet L. McQuaid, Hazardous and Solid Waste:
EPA Adopts Controversial New Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVT, Summer 1992, at 42, 44.
39. See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 900 (1995).
40. See Douglas 0. Cooper et al., Lender Liability: The Next Horizon, PROB. &
PROP., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 57 (reporting developments in lender liability case law
under CERCLA after the Kelley decision). However, Congress has recently taken
some action on the issue. Indeed, several bills introduced in the 104th Congress
address lender liability issues. See, e.g., H-Lt 1362, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301
(1995). H.R. 1362 would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to provide that
"'[a] lender shall only be liable pursuant to a Federal environmental law when the
lender actually participates in management of another person's activities which cre-
ate liability.'" It would also explicitly define participation in management to "'not
include merely having the capacity to influence, or the unexercised right to control
such activities.'"
41. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.105D.020(6)b)(ii), .040 (West 1992
& Supp. 1995).
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conditions would have been subject to as many as five funda-
mentally different legal outcomes over the course of fifteen
years. Moreover, these changes in the law took place while the
statutory language remained the same. The lender liability
scenario thus aptly illustrates the volatility of environmental
law and the special concerns for environmental law practitio-
ners.
To be sure, other areas of the law change, but not often by
the magnitude of changes experienced in environmental law.
The pace and degree of change in environmental law raises the
question of whether it is reasonable for an attorney in the field
not to expect environmental law to change. It may not be
enough, therefore, to offer an opinion about the state of envi-
ronmental law as it exists at one moment, even if the opinion
is perfectly updated, without advising a client about the poten-
tial for change. Yet few clients want to hear that the legal
opinion for which they have just paid expires tomorrow. Attor-
neys thus may be tempted or pressured to make opinions
sound more permanent than the history of environmental law
warrants, despite the fact that attorneys are duty-bound by the
laws of malpractice to render candid advice.
C. The Rules of the Game Are Often Dense and Inscrutable,
and Sometimes Even Invisible
Even when environmental law stands still long enough to
allow one to refer reasonably to it as stable and predictable,
the stark reality is that the law often turns out to be too com-
plicated and difficult to uncover. Failure to know and properly
apply the law is the largest category of substantive errors
alleged in malpractice claims generally.42 The complexity of
environmental law suggests that if the environmental law
malpractice claims dam breaks, failure to know and properly
apply the law will be fertile ground for claimants.
Two qualities in environmental law conflict in this respect.
First, the primary substance of environmental law is heavily
regulatory and dominated by dense, detailed script. Second,
and a greater source of frustration, is the practice by many
environmental law agencies of creating "law" through informal
guidance that is not published in general circulation. A classic
42. See CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 11, at 6 tbl. 3
(indicating that failure to know and properly apply the law comprised almost 10% of
the substantive error malpractice claims analyzed in the ABA's 1980-85 study peri-
od).
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example of both user-unfriendly qualities is provided in the
EPA's solid and hazardous waste definitions under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which combined
comprise about six pages of the Code of Federal Regulations,'
scores of pages of the Federal Register,' and hundreds of
pages of internal agency guidances.45 Few lawyers, even the
most experienced in solid waste law, fully understand the
EPA's definitions.46
43. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.2-.3 (1994).
44. 57 Fed- Reg. 38,564 (1992); 56 Fed. Reg. 42,511-12 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg.
32,688 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 7206 (1991); 50 Fed. Reg. 33,542 (1985); 50 Fed. Reg.
664 (1985). For a discussion and evaluation of the EPA's drafting of the solid waste
and hazardous waste definition regulation, as well as the full set of original RCRA
implementation rules, see MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE EN momiEN-rAL PROTECTIONx
AGENCY ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS-FROM NIXON TO CLINTON c. 4 (expanded
ed. 1994). The RCRA rulemaking process has been described as a "self-perpetuating
crisis." Id. at 125.
45. See generally SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENvTL L%w,
AAEnsCAN BAR ASs'N, RCRA POLICY DOCUMENTS: FINDING YOUR WAY THROUGH THE
MAZE OF EPA GUIDANCE ON SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 6-8 (Theodore L. Garrett
& Joshua D. Sarnoff eds., 1993) (containing a compilation of many guidance-type
policy documents); Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the
Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1312 (1992) (arguing that the use of noalegislative guid-
ance documents to bind the public violates the Administrative Procedure Act); F.
William Brownell, 'Regulation by Guidance": A Response to EPA, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'r, Winter 1995, at 56, 58 (responding to George Wyeth's article and noting that
the regulated community is troubled by "agency action that creates or changes fun-
damental legal obligation without notice and an opportunity to comment"); George B.
Wyeth, The "Regulation by Guidance" Debate: An Agency Perspective, NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1995, at 52, 52 (noting that the EPA supplements its
statutes and promulgated regulations with guidance documents, which can range
from highly detailed technical documents to broad policy statements).
This body of informal guidance often leads to difficulty in defining the "law" in
particular circumstances. However, other problems also lurk on the environmental
law landscape with respect to interpreting regulations that are "on the books." For
example, several courts and administrative tribunals recently have refused to enforce
EPA regulations because they fail to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct.
See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing to
enforce the EPA's regulatory interpretation of a rule the agency had promulgated
under the Toxic Substances Control Act because it was "so far from a reasonable
person's understanding of the regulations that [it] could not have fairly informed
[the defendant] of the agency's perspective"); In re CWMA Chem. Serva. Inc., TSCA
App. No. 93-1, 1995 WL 302356, at *13 (EPA App. May 15, 1995), available in
WESTLAW, FENV-EPA database (refusing to enforce the EPA's regulatory interpre-
tation of the Toxic Substances Control Act because of lack of "fair notice to the
regulated entity of the conduct required or prohibited).
46. See Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA. The "Mind-Numbing' Provi-
sions of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 Envtl. L. Rep.: News &
Analysis (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254, 10,256 (1991) (declaring that the definition of haz-
ardous waste "is one of the most complicated and confusing aspects of the [RCRAI
Subtitle C program"). As one EPA official stated with respect to the defimition of
hazardous waste, which is a subset of solid waste, the regulations are "'a regulatory
cuckoo land of definition.... I believe we have five people in the agency who an-
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The foregoing is but a representative example of the com-
plexity found in environmental law. During the EPA's twenty-
five years of existence, it has amassed over ten thousand pages
in the Code of Federal Regulations,47 with a correspondingly
hefty component of Federal Register preamble text to consult
and a vast netherworld of informal guidance to explore.48 Add
the other fifteen or so federal environmental agencies, and the
pot becomes even bigger.49
Is it possible for any one attorney to know all this law?
Never. Is it possible for any one attorney to know the full
substantive "law" of even one environmental law statute cold?
Probably not. Add to that reality the fact that environmental
law is split into many portals and changes rapidly, and it
requires a Herculean effort on the part of lawyers to claim
competence in even an isolated sliver of environmental law.
One does not "dabble" in environmental law, and those who
practice in the field full time had better know what they do
not know.
D. Factual and Technical Interpretive Gray Areas Make for
Legal Guesswork
In today's high-tech world of lawyering, it may be possible
to combine enough hard drive space, Internet connections, and
sophisticated database software to allow instantaneous recall of
all information that falls within the domain of environmental
law. Despite this luxury, an environmental practitioner contin-
ues nonetheless to face vast gray areas in how to apply the
law. Environmental law imports many concepts from other
derstand what "hazardous waste" is.'" United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 882
(E.D. Wash. 1991) (quoting Don R. Clay, EPA Assistant Administrator for the Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response).
47. 40 C.F.R. pts. 1-799 (1995).
48. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law Trivia Test No. 2, 22 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 807, 812 (1995) (noting that the EPA's RCRA regulations fill
697 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations and 19,500 pages of informal guid-
ance).
49. Refer to notes 20-21 supra and the accompanying text (discussing the num-
ber of other governmental agencies who play a part in regulating environmental
law). Professor Jerry Anderson reports, presumably from first-hand experimentation,
that "[ilf you stack on the floor the volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations that
contain environmental regulations, they measure over three and a half feet high."
Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J.
395, 413 (1995). He reports further that the "EPA alone published almost 3500 pag-
es of proposed and final regulations in the Federal Register during the first six
months of 1994" and that the many federal agencies with some environmental ju-
risdiction combined "churn out over 35 pages of new or proposed regulations every
working day." Id.
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fields, such as chemistry and biology, that are not susceptible
to easy translation into legal contexts. Environmental law thus
imports all the uncertainties and imprecisions of the fields it
incorporates. As sure as the law itself may be, this quality of
environmental law practice clouds the picture.
A good example concerns the restriction under the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA)"0 of actions that might harm protect-
ed species of fish and wildlife. The ESA proclaims that no
person may harm such species," and administrative regula-
tion defines "harm" to mean any activity that causes death or
injury to such species, even by way of habitat destruction."
Indeed, after some controversy in the lower federal courts as to
the validity of that regulatory definition,' the Supreme Court
has clarified that the rule is a valid administrative interpreta-
tion of the statute," but that only actions that foreseeably
and proximately lead to such harm are prohibited under the
ESA.5 Congress may eventually have the last word on this
issue, but for the moment the law is clear.
Clients, however, are seldom satisfied by a bland recitation
of the current state of the law. They want an answer to the
question: "If I were to do X, would I violate the ESA?" Clients
may believe this is a straightforward question deserving a
straightforward answer. In most circumstances, however, the
answer lies in the vast gray area that is characteristic of many
legal questions that must be resolved under the ESA.'
50. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
51. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994).
52. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
53. Compare Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781,
784 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the validity of the regulatory definition of harm and
interpreting it to include imminent threats of injury to wildlife) with Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1472 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (holding invalid the Fish & Wildlife Service regulation defining harm to em-
brace habitat modifications), revod, 115 S. CL 2407 (1995); see also Steven G.
Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under the Endangered
Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 155, 236 (1995) (describing the history of
judicial interpretation of the harm definition). The history of the harm rule in the
lower courts is a fitting example of the unpredictable change inherent in environ-
mental law.
54. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115
S. Ct. 2407, 2418 (1995).
55. See id. at 2412 n.9.
We do not agree with the dissent that the regulation covers results that are
not "even foreseeable ... no matter how long the chain or causality be-
tween modification and injury." Respondents have suggested no reason
why... [the regulation] should not be read to incorporate ordinary require-
ments of proximate causation and foreseeability.
Id. (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
56. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED
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Whether an activity will foreseeably and proximately harm a
protected species is a question that in many cases could long
keep a battery of biologists occupied in heated debate.17 In-
deed, it is not unusual for controversy to surface over what
constitutes a species, much less what activities will harm it."5
The ESA is not alone in environmental law by injecting
impossible-to-solve fact issues into the legal fabric. When those
unresolved questions of science and technology are crammed
forcibly into legal settings that generally require yes or no
outcomes, the results may seem arbitrary. An environmental
attorney's job of predicting those results thus becomes more a
process of educated guessing than reasoned analysis. Unfortu-
nately, a lawyer's natural impulse to provide concrete answers
and advice pulls the attorney towards the practice of diminish-
ing or ignoring the many hidden complexities of the scientific
and technical issues lurking in environmental law.
E. When Public Protection Is Concerned, the Government
Holds All the High Cards
The prototypical high-tech environmental lawyer, now
armed with a bevy of technical consultants to help clarify the
technical and scientific issues of a case, faces yet another com-
plication in the form of the "500-pound gorilla" of environmen-
tal law-the government and its public interest mission. Envi-
ronmental law broadly charges the government with protection
of the public health and welfare59 and gives government many
SPECIES AcT (1995) (pre-publication copy on file with the Houston Law Review) (out-
lining the various points of intersection between law and science under the ESA and
reviewing the law's performance from a science perspective).
57. See, e.g., Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 431 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (rejecting
the claim that a house construction would harm the Perdido Key beach mouse be-
cause of insufficient scientific evidence of causation).
58. See, e.g., Endangered Species Comm. of the Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of S. Cal. v.
Babbitt, 852 F. Supp. 32, 38 (D.D.C. 1994) (concluding that the Department of Inte-
rior Secretary's failure to publicly release a copy of one scientist's controversial re-
search study defining taxonomy of species invalidated the Secretary's decision to
protect species under the ESA). The ESA requires that many of the factual determi-
nations relevant to the listing of protected species be made based on the "best
available" scientific evidence, a determination that in itself is subject to intense
scientific community debate. See Laurence M. Bogert, That's My Story and I'm
Stickin' to It: Is the "Best Available" Science Any Available Science Under the Endan-
gered Species Act?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 149 (1994) (concluding that congressional
failure to clarify legislatively what constitutes the "best available" scientific evidence
renders the ESA imperfect).
59. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988) (providing the executive branch with
the authority to issue administrative orders to compel remediation for releases of
hazardous substances posing an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare"). The theme of protecting the public health and welfare
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advantages over the regulated community, from its broad
rulemaking authority to its powerful enforcement arsenal, to
carry out that purpose. The unequal balance of power in the
government's favor poses practical complications for environ-
mental lawyers in many settings.
Consider, for example, the prospect of settling with the
federal government over the question of liability for investiga-
tion and remediation at a CERCLA site. The statute creates
many "incentives" for the regulated community to settle such
claims and creates methods for the government to induce such
agreements. For example, if a party does not settle with the
government, but others involved in the same violation do settle
for part of the aggregate liability the government seeks, the
nonsettling party could remain liable for the entire amount of
unsettled liability.'0 Alternatively, parties who do settle with
the government cannot approach the settlement process in the
traditional sense of an arm's length negotiation, as the agen-
cies make what is close to a "take it or leave it" offer with
terms generally unfavorable to the regulated parties."1 Advis-
ing clients about settlement options on this lopsided playing
field can be a painful experience.
The government enjoys many other built-in advantages,
not the least of which is broad judicial deference to agency
statutory interpretations' and findings of fact.' One cannot
permeates federal environmental law. A computer assisted search in September 1995
of the phrase "public w/1 health w/l welfare" in the U.S. Code file of the Environ-
mental library of the LEXIS electronic database reveals that this construction ap-
pears in over 7000 different sections of the environmental statutes.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988); see also Barry S. Neuman, No Way Out? The
Plight of the Superfund Nonsettlor, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.: News & Analysis (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,295, 10,296 (1990) (noting that nonsettlors do not have contribution rights
against those parties that settle with the EPA, leaving them liable for the remain-
der).
61. See, e.g., Robert W. Frantz, Superfund Settlements: A Vanishing Breed, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 14, 14 (noting that the EPA's current approach
to Superfund settlements "flies in the face of traditional settlement principles" be-
cause the EPA imposes terms and conditions in settlement documents that require
"open-ended commitments by potentially responsible parties). See generally THE
INo. NETWORK FOR SUPERFUND SETrLEMENTS, SUPERFUND NEGOTIATION HANDBOOK
(1990) (analyzing EPA's model settlement document for allocating responsibility for
remedial investigation of CERCLA sites). In July 1995, the EPA and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) announced revisions to the model consent decree designed to
streamline the negotiation process, though apparently not to the full satisfaction of
the regulated community. See 60 Fed. Reg. 38,817 (1995). See generally Changes to
Model Consent Decree Ease Future, De Micromis Cleanup Liability, 26 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 587, 587 (1995) (noting that according to the DOJ the revised model consent
decree contains language that "'suggests that settling defendants' liability for addi-
tional response actions simply be reserved,'" but that such language may be omitted
in "'appropriate circumstances").
62. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
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take for granted, therefore, that good facts and favorable law
will carry the day in the face of this stacked deck. Saying
"we'll see you in court" to the government in the environmen-
tal law context can be a risky venture for the uninitiated.
F. Client Liabilities Are Potentially Astronomical
The characteristics of environmental law described in the
preceding sections underscore the importance of assessing legal
malpractice exposure when considering the potential extent of
liabilities associated with environmental regulation. In short,
clients face monumental exposure for the costs of implementing
pollution control technology, the penalties for violating the
laws, and the liabilities for remediation of environmental deg-
radations they cause. The rules of liability exacerbate that
condition. CERCLA, for example, imposes strict, joint and sev-
eral, and retroactive liability' for remediations averaging in
the tens of millions of dollars for implementation costs. 5 Un-
der other environmental laws, civil penalties for violations can
grow at rates as high as $25,000 per day.66
Other legal fields subject to intense regulation and high
client liabilities, such as tax law and securities law, exhibit a
disproportionately high number of expensive malpractice claim
payouts.67 Even if clients' malpractice antennae are not more
acute in those settings, the simple reality that clients face
higher potential losses in such fields can be expected to trans-
late into higher potential malpractice exposures for attorneys.
U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994) (listing the limited instances in which a court
is to set aside agency findings).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2) (1988) (imposing "full and total costs" on the
owner, operator, or otherwise responsible party).
65. The average cost of cleaning up a CERCLA site in 1984 was estimated to
range from $10 million to $33.3 million. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, SUPERFUND STRATEGY: SUMMARY at 22 tbl. 4 (1985).
66. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (capping civil penalties for violation of the
Clean Water Act at a maximum of $25,000 per day).
67. In the ABA's study, 7.2% of tax malpractice claim payouts and 7.3% of
securities malpractice claim payouts were over $100,000, approximately twice the
rate experienced by most other fields of practice at that level of payout. CHARACTER-
ISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 11, at 69-70 tbl. 38.
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III. THE MALPRACTICE EXPERIENCE IN ENVRONMENTAL
LAw-A SPECIALTY PRACTICE WITHOUT DEFINED
SPECIALTY MALPRACTICE STANDARDS
None of environmental law's characteristics described in
the previous sections are unique within the practice of law.
What makes the environmental law field special is that there
are numerous settings in which many of those characteristics,
if not all of them, are simultaneously in operation. This quality
of environmental law propels practitioners towards increasing
specialization. However, this trend does not necessarily lead to
any particular conclusion as to whether specialists need to
worry about malpractice more than the average lawyer. Un-
fortunately, the number of environmental malpractice claim
decisions to date is too small to allow meaningful testing of
this hypothesis. Nevertheless, there may be lessons to learn
from practice fields sharing some of environmental law's char-
acteristics.
A- The Specialization of Environmental Law
There is a joke told at environmental law seminars about
two attorneys, strangers to each other, who take adjoining
seats on an airplane flight. They introduce themselves, and,
upon learning they are both attorneys, they begin to discuss
the legal profession. After a while, much to their surprise they
discover they are partners in different offices of the same
large, multi-state law firm. As the discussion progresses, they
are astonished to find that they both toil away in the firm's
environmental law specialty section and, even more amazingly,
that they both sub-specialize in solid waste regulation under
RCRA. Finally both realize why they have never before met:
one sub-sub-specializes in hazardous waste and the other sub-
sub-specializes in nonhazardous waste.'
As improbable as that anecdote seems, the prevailing de-
gree of specialization in environmental law suggested by the
story is a reality. Even with no formal national or state certifi-
cation in the field of environmental law,' lawyers practicing
68. I cannot attribute a source for the joke; I can only attribute the person
who first told it to me: Jeff Civins, one of the founders of environmental law prac-
tice in Texas.
69. As of May 1995, no national or state bar organization recognized any form
of specialization certification in environmental law. See Memorandum from Alfred R.
Light, Chair, ABA SONREEL Special Committee on Lawyer Competence & Special-
ization, to Kinnan Goleman, Chair, ABA SONREEL, at 3 (May 10, 1995) (on file
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in the field themselves have organized into a highly structured
array of sub-specializations. For example, within the ABA's
Section on Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law
(SONREEL), over eleven different environmental committees
exist,7" many of which describe their substantive scope as em-
bracing several sub-specialized areas.7 Environmental law is
not exclusively in SONREEL's domain, however, as lawyers in
other major practice areas have blended their practices with
environmental law specialties. For example, the ABA's Real
Property, Probate, and Trust Section designates several com-
mittees that handle environmental law.72
B. The Absence of Cohesive "Specialist" Standards Addressing
the Special Characteristics of Environmental Law
Specialization in environmental law, from the practitioners'
perspective, makes sense as a defense mechanism against the
with the Houston Law Review) (predicting that state programs are unlikely to devel-
op environmental specialties and concluding that if environmental law is to be rec-
ognized by certification, it most likely will occur on a national scale).
From 1988 to 1990, this author served on a committee of the State Bar of
Texas that was charged with the task of determining whether an environmental law
specialization certification was desirable. Although the committee issued no formal
report, my sense of the deliberations was that most committee members concluded
that environmental law was so full of sub-specializations that administration and
evaluation of this program would be difficult and perhaps not useful to the public.
For an overview of the legal specialization certification trend, see STANDING COMM.
ON SPECIALIZATION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SPECIALIZATION DESK BOOK (revised ed.
1993).
70. The committees are: Air Quality; Environmental Crimes and Enforcement;
Environmental Quality; International Environmental Law; Solid and Hazardous
Waste; State and Regional Environmental Cooperation; Water Quality and Wetlands;
Environmental Litigation Techniques; Climate Change and Sustainable Development;
Special Committee on Toxic and Environmental Torts; and Brownfields Task Force.
SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. LAW, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
LEADERSHIP DIRECTORY 1995-1996, at 10-13 (1995).
71. For example, the SONREEL Water Quality and Wetlands Committee lists
the following among its substantive areas of coverage: Wetlands; Surface Water
Quality Standards; Groundwater Quality and Management; Watershed Planning/Non-
Point Source Pollution; Coastal Zone Management; Pretreatment; Storm Water; Efflu-
ent Guidelines; Oil Spills/Oil Pollution Act of 1990; Safe Drinking Water Act; and
Clean Water Act. ABA Section of Natural Resources, Energy, and Envtl. Law, Water
Quality and Wetlands Committee, Action Plan 5 (July 31, 1995) (on file with the
Houston Law Review).
72. The committees are: Air Quality/Asbestos; CERCLA; Environmental Aspects
of Corporations; Environmental Aspects of Lender Liability; Environmental Aspects of
Real Estate Transactions; Fiduciary Environmental Problems; Solid Wastes, RCRA
Issues and Underground Tanks and Wetlands and Endangered Species. AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, ABA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CLE COMMITTEE CHAIRS AND LIAISONS
1995-96, at 26-27. Other ABA sections have created substantial environmental law
specialization components, including the Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice
Section, Business Law Section, and Litigation Section. Id. at 4-5, 6-8, 12-14.
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complicating characteristics of the practice generally. It may
take one person's entire efforts to learn just one environmental
statute, keep abreast of all legislative and administrative de-
velopments under that statute, and field client questions aris-
ing in contexts that test the finest nuances and intricacies of
the law. In that sense, specialization is a protection against
malpractice.
Along with the increased degree of specialization, however,
may come other sources of heightened malpractice exposure
risks. Attorneys who profess to know more than the average
attorney about an area might fairly be expected to perform
commensurately and to not make substantive errors that a
generalist might commit. The specialization of environmental
law thus sends two messages to attorneys: to "non-environmen-
tal" attorneys, keep out; to "environmental" attorneys, stay in
your niche. Because those messages run contrary to strong
human impulses, such as maximizing income and creating a
stimulating professional practice, malpractice opportunities
could arise when an attorney strays into the wrong specializa-
tion area.
More importantly, the degree of specialization within envi-
ronmental law sends messages to consumers of legal services.
It is fair to say that both the legal profession and the legal
services market perceive environmental law as an area that
requires a high degree of specialized knowledge and experience
for competent performance.' If consumers of legal services
reasonably expect a specialist when they seek environmental
law advice, is it not also reasonable for them to expect the
attorney rendering such advice to live up to a specialist's stan-
dard?
Indeed, the specialized nature of environmental law sug-
gests that malpractice standards within the field cannot be
derived simply by applying the standards applicable to a legal
generalist. To be sure, when environmental lawyers make
mistakes that generalists should not make, such as missing
filing deadlines and other administrative errors, treating cli-
ents poorly, or acting with intentional malfeasance, they may
be found to have committed malpractice without the trier of
fact having to consider the complicated fabric of environmental
law.74 However, allegations of substantive error make up the
73. For example, the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), a legal
malpractice insurer, advises its member law firms that "[gliven the complexity of the
environmental laws and the enormous stakes involved, this practice is not for gener-
alists or 'dabblers.' Member Firm managements must ensure that their environmen-
tal specialists are highly trained and stay current." Freivogel, supra note 13, at 9-10.
74. A number of cases have involved allegations or findings that attorneys com-
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largest category of malpractice claims generally.7 Any men-
tion of the substance of environmental law thus necessarily
raises the question of the degree to which the notion of the
environmental law specialist provides the relevant malpractice
standard.
The use of the specialist standard is a relatively recent
phenomenon in legal malpractice law. For example, a leading
treatise on legal malpractice published in 1980 noted that a
"specialist in a particular field of legal practice is held to a
higher standard than the general practitioner ... [is an]
idea ... yet to be accepted as established principle."76 By the
mitted administrative and other nonsubstantive errors in environmental law. Howev-
er, in such cases, the attorney's knowledge of environmental law is not determina-
tive of the malpractice issue. See, e.g., Sacco v. Burke, 764 F. Supp. 918, 921
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 953 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding, on summary judgment, that
an environmental law attorney was not liable for malpractice for failing to appear at
a bond hearing because clients did not prove that, but for the alleged acts of mal-
practice, they would have prevailed in their request for stay of bond requirement);
International Controls Corp. v. Bondi, 1993 WL 331172, at *4, 5 (Del. Super. Ct.
July 9, 1993) (dismissing malpractice action against an attorney for failing to dis-
solve client's corporation, thereby rendering the client liable on an environmental
claim, because of lack of personal jurisdiction); B.K. Indus., Inc. v. Pinks, 533
N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (1988) (holding that, in a malpractice action against environmen-
tal attorneys who failed to attend a hearing in a criminal proceeding for unlawful
discharge of pollutants against the client, the client must show his innocence as to
the underlying conviction in order to prevail); Scrivner v. Hobson, 854 S.W.2d 148,
152 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding that an environmental
attorney who was sued for malpractice for, inter alia, settling clients' dispute with-
out their authorization was not entitled to protect the discovery of certain documents
relating to the settlement by privilege). On occasion, allegations of administrative
and client relations errors by environmental law attorneys have been brought
through discipline procedures. See, e.g., Complaint at 1-6, In re Kanter, Adm'r No.
93 CH (Ill. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n 1993) (No. 01393936).
75. Substantive errors made up approximately 43% of the claims evaluated in
the ABA's 1980s study. CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 11, at
6-7 tbl. 3. The ABA study used five categories of alleged malpractice error: (1) ad-
ministrative, (2) substantive, (3) client relations, (4) intentional wrong, and (5) other.
Id. Substantive error included failure to know the law, inadequate investigation,
planning error, failure to know or ascertain a deadline, record search errors, conflict
of interest, missed tax consequences, and math errors. Id. Administrative errors, by
contrast, included failure to calendar, procrastination, failure to file, failure to react
to calendar, clerical error, and lost files. Id.
76. DAVID J. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2:10,
at 24 (1980). Prior to 1980, some legal commentators argued that "[ilt is to be ex-
pected that one who holds himself out as a specialist will be held to the legal skill
and knowledge common among such specialists." John W. Wade, The Attorney's Lia-
bility for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 764 (1959). There is no evidence, howev-
er, of that assertion ever having been presented to and adopted by the courts during
that period. See RONALD E. MALLEN & VICTOR B. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 253,
at 327 (2d ed. 1981) ("Until the 1970's there were very few decisions which dis-
cussed the existence of specialization or suggested a standard of care predicated
upon comparison to other than the 'ordinary' attorney."); Note, Attorney Malpractice,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1302 (1963) ("[N]o case holding an attorney to a higher
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time of publication of its supplement in 1995, however, the
same treatise observed that the rule now is that "one who
holds himself out as specializing and as possessing greater
than ordinary knowledge and skill in a particular field[] will
be held to the standard of performance of those who hold
themselves out as specialists in that area."'
This shift in approach mirrors the general trend towards
specialization in legal practice. As one commentator observed
in 1986, in the midst of the period of increasing specialization
within the legal services industry, the general trend in the
legal profession towards specialization appears to be impacting
legal malpractice decisions:
If any one theme is emerging from these decisions, it is that
attorneys who perform services in those areas such as tax,
SEC work, or labor law which are generally considered to be
the province of specialists, will be held to the standard of a
specialist in that area rather than to the standard of a
generalist who may also dabble in, say, giving sophisticated
tax opinions.7'
Today no meaningful debate appears to exist, in either case law
or commentary, over the proposition that "a lawyer holding
himself out to the public and the profession as specializing in
an area of the law must exercise the skill, prudence, and dili-
gence exercised by other specialists of ordinary skill and capac-
ity specializing in the same field."79 Malpractice law thus has
evolved along with the trend towards specialization in legal
practice, and hence courts now routinely adopt a higher stan-
dard of care for legal specialists."0
standard because he was a specialist has been found.").
77. MEISELIAN, supra note 76, § 2:10, at 34 (Supp. 1995).
78. James J. McCabe, Legal Malpractice-The Lawyer as a Target, PENN. B.
ASSN Q., Oct. 1985, at 209, 214.
79. Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (Ct. App. 1975); see also 1
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTcE § 15.4, at 867 (3d
ed. 1989) ("No court has rejected the concept that a more demanding standard of
care should be applied to specialists."). Some courts have tempered their willingness
to apply a specialist standard when the applicable state provides no formal proce-
dure for specialization designation or certification. However, most courts have found
the presence or absence of a formal specialization designation program immaterial to
the malpractice standard or simply have not mentioned the issue at all. Compare
Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 655 (Wash. 1992) (refusing to adjudge a real es-
tate lawyer as a specialist when state law prohibits advertising as a specialist in
this area) with Duffey Law Office, S.C. v. Tank Transp., Inc., 535 N.W.2d 91, 94-95
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (deciding that the specialist standard "comports with the reality
of modern-day legal practice," notwithstanding the fact that state bar rules prohibit
lawyers from stating or implying they are specialists).
80. See, e.g., Transcraft, Inc. v. Galvin, Stalmack, Kirschner & Clark, 39 F.3d
812, 815 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that specialists will be measured under "higher
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A field that has become as specialized as environmental
law, therefore, places the burden on all lawyers who render
services involving the substance of environmental law to per-
form with the competence of the specialist, whether they hold
themselves out as generalists or specialists. To environmental
law specialists, moreover, the degree of sub-specialization with-
in the field may even create the corollary danger-that any
environmental lawyer rendering services on, say, a Clean Air
Act matter, will be measured against the standard of a Clean
Air Act sub-specialist. If it is beyond reasonable expectation
that one lawyer alone can master the Clean Air Act, the En-
dangered Species Act, and the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act, then perhaps one ought not try. The day of the
environmental law generalist, at least in the eyes of malprac-
tice law, may have passed.
Although both of these conclusions follow from the trend in
environmental law towards specialization and the trend in mal-
practice law to hold specialists to higher standards, the courts
have tested neither conclusion. Indeed, very few published opin-
ions involve environmental malpractice claims, and no cases
raise the important issues of whether specialist standards can
be applied to attorneys providing advice on environmental is-
sues. For example, in Wischkin v. Bellitto81 the court denied
summary judgment to an attorney whose client, the seller in a
real estate transaction, accused him of malpractice for failing to
comply with provisions of a Connecticut law requiring property
standards"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1990 (1995); Weitzel v. Oil Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int'l Union, 667 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1982) (implying that labor law at-
torneys are to be held to a specialist standard); M & S Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v.
Keiler, 564 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (D.D.C. 1983) (treating attorney as labor law spe-
cialist), rev'd on other grounds, 738 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Bowman v. Doherty,
686 P.2d 112, 120 (Kan. 1984) (treating attorney as specialist in criminal defense
law); Procanik v. Cillo, 502 A.2d 94, 101-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (treat-
ing attorney as specialist in medical malpractice law); Rodriguez v. Horton, 622 P.2d
261, 264 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (treating attorney as workmen's compensation law
specialist), writ quashed, 622 P.2d 1046 (N.M. 1981); Rhodes v. Batilla, 848 S.W.2d
833, 843 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (treating attorney as
tax law specialist); Walker v. Bangs, 601 P.2d 1279; 1283 (Wash. 1979) (treating
attorney as expert in longshoremen personal injury actions under maritime law);
Duffey Law Office, 535 N.W.2d at 96 (adopting, for the first time in Wisconsin, the
specialist standard in case involving a pension benefits law expert); see also Meyer
v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 518 (Wyo. 1995) ("[Blefore an attorney files a legal mal-
practice action where the underlying case of alleged malpractice involves a complex
or specialized area of the law, with which they are unfamiliar, that attorney should
first consult with an expert in the complex or specialized legal arena about the
standard of care."). Expert testimony is usually necessary to prove the standard of
care required in specialty practice areas. See Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Expert Witness
Testimony in Legal Malpractice Cases, 45 S.C. L. REV. 727, 735 (1994).
81. No. CV92 030 02 10S, 1994 WL 386022 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 15, 1994).
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sellers to provide both the buyers and the state with a "nega-
tive declaration" containing assurances that any hazardous
wastes on the property had been adequately remediated or
managed. 2 The case makes no mention, however, of the need
for expert testimony to define the environmental law specialist's
expected level of knowledge, or even if a specialist's standard
should apply.
Similarly, in Hartt v. Schwartz' the plaintiffs alleged that
their attorneys in a real estate purchase transaction failed to
request that the sellers produce adequate assurances regarding
the presence of hazardous wastes and other sources of contami-
nation of the property, including the type of "negative declara-
tion" involved in Wischkin." Without discussing the merits of
that environmental law malpractice claim, however, the court
dismissed the action as barred by the statute of limitations.'
After extensive research, this author located no other disposi-
tions involving allegations or findings of attorney substantive
error in environmental law, much less what the standard of
care in such cases would be.
The paucity of case law addressing malpractice in environ-
mental law poses a dilemma for practitioners in the field. Al-
though the data to date are thin, there exists a widely held,
and perhaps not unreasonable, perception that malpractice
claims in environmental law could increase significantly in the
near future." The aggressively self-specialized nature of envi-
ronmental practice suggests that it could be subjected to higher
malpractice standards. And yet there is virtually nothing to as-
sist environmental attorneys in knowing what level of compe-
tence malpractice law will entail. Hence, as a "second best"
guide to environmental law malpractice standards, other recog-
nized specialty fields of legal practice that share some of the
82. See id at *1. The attorney moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the client was not fined by the State, and thus suffered no harm. See id. The
Court, in denying the motion, noted that the client had alleged a loss of $10,000,
lost time from work, and expenditure of attorney's fees in renegotiating the sale. Id.
83. No. CV 92 0331912, 1993 WL 479806 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1993).
84. See id. at *1.
85. See id. at *2. Similar malpractice allegations are discussed in the unpub-
lished appellate opinion in Liquid Air Corp. v. Ideal Gas Prods., Inc., No. A-2430-
92T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 1994) (on file with the Houston Law Re-
view), in which the purchaser of contaminated property alleged that the seller's at-
torneys were liable for rendering an opinion letter containing the statement that the
sale of the property was "'not in contravention of any applicable Federal, state or
local law.'" Id. at 2. The appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
claim against the attorneys, noting that the attorneys conceded ignorance of New
Jersey statutes governing the transfer of contaminated properties. See id. at 15-16.
86. Refer to text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
199
HeinOnline  -- 33 Hous. L. Rev. 199 1996-1997
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
traits of environmental law, but which operate under more
developed bodies of malpractice doctrine, are reviewed in the
following Part.
IV. DRAWING MALPRACTICE PRINCIPLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW FROM ANALOGOUS SETrTINGS
The discussion thus far has demonstrated several qualities
of environmental law practice that necessitate reasoned devel-
opment of malpractice standards. First, the characteristics of
environmental law substance, administration, and practice give
rise to conditions ripe for malpractice when weighed against or-
dinary legal practice experience. Second, malpractice law most
likely will measure environmental attorneys facing claims of
malpractice based on substantive errors against a specialist
standard that imposes a heightened level of knowledge and
care. Third, because of the low number of cases dealing with
environmental law malpractice liability, virtually no instructive
authority exists for determining what the content of the mal-
practice standards will be. At best, we can only predict how the
substance of malpractice law in the environmental practice
setting will unfold, and perhaps the best "crystal ball" for that
prediction is to examine the malpractice experiences of those
practice areas that resemble environmental law in the first two
respects listed above.
A Lessons from Common Vineyards-Using Tax, Patent, and
Securities Law as the Reference Points for Environmental
Law Malpractice Standards
Even before the notion of the specialist standard of care in
legal malpractice was widely endorsed, several practice areas
generally perceived as "specialties" were known for posing
heightened malpractice problems for attorneys."7 Among those
specialty areas were practices in tax, patent, and securities law.
These three practice areas offer close analogies to environmen-
tal law: tax law is highly regulated and subject to rapid change;
patent law struggles with scientific and technical issues; and
securities law involves potentially high client liabilities and a
regulatory scheme directed at protecting the public. The
87. See generally MEISELMAN, supra note 76 (devoting separate chapters to liti-
gation, securities, wills, trusts and estates, real property, domestic relations, appel-
late, criminal defense, and the combined category of tax, patent, corporate, and con-
tract law).
200 [Vol. 33:173
HeinOnline  -- 33 Hous. L. Rev. 200 1996-1997
1996] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MALPRACTICE 201
experience of specialists in these practice areas, which has been
the subject of significantly more malpractice claims than has
environmental law," may offer some indication of what lies
ahead for attorneys practicing environmental law.'
1. Tax Law-Deference to Attorneys Hacking Through the
Regulatory Thicket. Unlike environmental law, which is partial-
ly governed by common law," tax law is entirely a creature of
legislation and regulation. Although tax law is not regulated by
as many agencies as is environmental law, it is subject to a
variety of interpretations, rapid changes, and disparate applica-
tions." Indeed, like environmental law, tax law suffers from
the "invisibility factor" that is created by the presence of infor-
mal, but persuasive, sources of authority such as Revenue Rul-
ings and proposed interpretive regulations.' Hence, to the
same extent as environmental law practitioners, tax practitio-
ners must keep abreast of the changing nature of the law and
the intricacies of interpretation that define the law.
Remarkably, however, notwithstanding that tax practitio-
ners have faced their regulatory quagmire for far longer than
environmental law practitioners, there are very few cases hold-
ing that an attorney has committed malpractice as a result of
88. Whereas environmental law provided the underlying subject matter of only
31 malpractice claims from 1980 to 1985, securities law produced 582 claims, tax
law produced 458 claims, and patent law (together with the related practice area of
trademark and copyright law) produced 167 claims. CHARAcTERISTICS OF LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 2-3 tbl. 1.
89. Consistent with the scope of this Article, the following discussion of legal
malpractice in tax, patent, and securities law is focused on the characteristics of
those practice areas that closely approximate those of environmental law and con-
tribute to the potential for heightened malpractice exposure. For a general overview
of sources discussing malpractice principles in tax, patent, and securities law, see
DESK GUIDE, supra note 1, at 252-57.
90. See WILLIAI H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 112 (2d ed. 1994)
("To a surprising degree, the legal history of the environment has been written by
nuisance law.").
91. Tax law can fairly lay claim to having attained the reputation of being
exceedingly complex long before environmental law reached that status. See, eg.,
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMNTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POL-
CY 141 (1992) ("Environmental law has become so complicated in recent years that
the field is beginning to resemble tax law, where practitioners must be specialists in
order to comprehend fully the meaning of regulations."). For example, in 1913 the
entire federal tax law, including explanations and related materials, fit into a single
400-page volume. Tom Herman, Tax Report: Briefs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1995, at
Al. Today, those materials require 40,500 pages spread through 22 volumes. Id.
92. See David W. Evans & Cory M. Martin, Liability and Loss Prevention for
Tax Practitioners, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REP. 3, 16 (1990) (reasoning that positions
taken contrary to Revenue Rulings and proposed interpretive regulations may subject
attorneys to heightened malpractice exposure, even though such sources are not
legally binding).
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providing erroneous tax law advice. Claims of that nature have
been litigated, but, perhaps based on sympathy for the burden
imposed on tax attorneys by regulatory morass, tax practitio-
ners are often relieved of liability for erroneous advice when
the advice was the product of reasonable judgment and was fol-
lowed after informed consent.
Tax law malpractice is judged according to a sensible rule:
if an attorney rendering tax law advice remains diligently
aware of the law, exercises reasonable judgment with respect to
advice on questions of interpretation, and advises the client
regarding reasonably foreseeable changes in the law and differ-
ences of interpretation that could result in the attorney's judg-
ment being wrong, then the attorney will not be held liable for
errors of judgment resulting from such doubtful or unsettled
propositions in the law.93 Thus, the difficulties attorneys face
when confronting complex tax issues are tempered, albeit only
when the attorney exercises reasonable judgment based on
diligent inquiry 4 and only when the client is fully advised of
the potential for error.95
93. See, e.g., Martinson Mfg. Co. v. Seery, 351 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Iowa 1984)
(holding a tax attorney not liable for "an error in judgment on points of now occur-
rence or of nice or doubtful construction, or for a mistaken opinion on a point of law
that has not been settled by a court of last resort and on which reasonable doubt
may well be entertained by informed lawyers"); Quarles Drilling Corp. v. General Ac-
cident Ins. Co., 538 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that a tax attorney
did not commit malpractice for rendering erroneous advice on a question that was
"complex and close" and "not definitely resolved by legislation or jurisprudence,"
because the attorney's opinion was "based upon reasonable consideration of applica-
ble legal rules or principles"), writ denied, 541 So. 2d 856 (La. 1989); see also Evans
& Martin, supra note 92, at 16 (noting that "informed consents" given by the client
after disclosure of an unsettled or debatable question in the law is a tax attorney's
best defense against malpractice).
94. The factors considered in determining whether the inquiry was diligent
include: (1) the intensity of research, see, e.g., Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr.
714, 721 (Ct. App. 1979) ("'[Elven with respect to an unsettled area of the law, ...
an attorney assumes an obligation to his client to undertake reasonable research in
an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and to make an informed deci-
sion . . . .'") (alteration in original) (citation omitted); (2) the client's instructions
and interests, see, e.g., Rhodes v. Batilla, 848 S.W.2d 833, 840-41 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (holding a tax attorney's numerous ac-
tions in conflict with client's express interests, including signing of a consent form
that rendered client liable for the tax assessed against her, sufficient to constitute
legal malpractice); and (3) efforts to clarify the law through inquiry to authorities,
see, e.g., Harrell v. Crystal, 611 N.E.2d 908, 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
tax attorney who erroneously advised client of legality of tax shelter failed to meet
standard of care because of, among other things, of his "failure to request letter
ruling from the IRS to determine whether the shelters were legal").
95. See Dean A. Alper, Risks of Preparing Tax and Securities Opinions, 2 LE-
GAL MALPRACTICE REP. 9, 12 (1990) (stating that "California malpractice law requires
attorneys to anticipate and counsel on the impact of reasonably foreseeable changes
in the law affecting the client's interests" (emphasis added)). See generally Gary A.
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Courts may find it difficult to detect any fundamental dis-
tinction between tax and environmental law that would counsel
against applying the "reasonable judgment" malpractice defense
of tax law to environmental law by analogy. Both fields share
the characteristics of change and complexity. Attorneys in both
fields are often called upon to predict the compliance of clients'
proposed actions in the face of shifting and ambiguous princi-
ples. Attorneys in both fields, must exercise judgment about
how the law would resolve a particular issue. Therefore, provid-
ed the environmental attorney exercises reasonable judgment by
engaging in diligent research and investigation and applying
reasonable analysis and prediction, and provided the limitations
inherent in the judgment are fully communicated to the client,
courts may conclude that the attorney did not commit malprac-
tice, even though the attorney's judgment later appears to have
been misguided.
2. Patent Law-Self-Policing and Reasonable Reliance at
the Intersection of Law and Science. One of the principal servic-
es patent attorneys provide to clients is determining whether
the client's actions will constitute infringement of a valid pat-
ent. Indeed, the step of obtaining such an opinion is so funda-
mental that the failure of an infringing party to do so is evi-
dence of willful infringement, thereby entitling the patent hold-
er to additional damages." Reasonable reliance on a competent
opinion, on the other hand, may provide the basis for a defense
to a willful infringement claim.9" When the client's activities
involve highly technical mechanical, chemical, or other scientific
applications, the patent attorney's role in providing an infringe-
ment opinion may involve the kind of intersection of law and
science faced by environmental attorneys. Attorneys in these
two fields of legal practice thus face the common problem of
having to derive legal conclusions from complex, often ambigu-
ous, technical and scientific information.
Patent attorneys, however, for the most part have not
Munneke & Theresa E. Loscazo, The Lauer's Duty to Keep Clients Informed: Estab-
lishing a Standard of Care in Professional Liability Actions, 9 PACE L. REv. 391,
448-49 (1989) (concluding that the establishment of a cause of action for attorney
malpractice should incorporate the principles of informed client consent).
96. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); see also Ronald B. Coolley, Attorneys' Opin-
ions: Their Content and Can Corporate Counsel Write Them, 73 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'Y 261, 261 (1991) (stating that willful infringement can be found
only after analyzing the totality of the circumstances, including whether legal advice
was secured).
97. See Coolley, supra note 96, at 269.
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confronted malpractice problems as a result of the technical
nature of their practice. To be sure, patent attorneys have
made substantive legal errors in infringement opinions and
other services they provide, which have led to malpractice
claims.9" However, no reported case involves the claim, much
less the finding, that the patent attorney's legal malpractice
arose from the mistaken use of technical information or prin-
ciples.99
One possible explanation for the lack of malpractice claims,
other than the possibility that patent attorneys simply do not
commit malpractice,0 0 is the fact that "patent law practice is
so technically sophisticated, even to the ordinary attorney, it is
unlikely that a client would independently detect an error by
his patent attorney." °1 However, a person who has been sued
for infringement after securing a patent attorney's infringement
opinion is likely to examine the opinion closely, possibly with
the benefit of technical experts, and is likely to ferret out any
technical errors the attorney may have made. In any event,
relying on the ignorance of clients as a barrier to malpractice
claims is a risky venture.
Another possible explanation-one that gives clients credit
for being intelligent consumers-is the requirement that, in
order to assert the attorney opinion defense to a claim of willful
infringement, the party charged with infringement must demon-
strate that the attorney's opinion was "competent."'02 To sus-
tain that burden, that party must show, among other things,
that the attorney's opinion rested on a careful analysis that
compared and contrasted the potentially infringing device or
98. See, e.g., Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 557 N.E.2d 525,
527, 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that a claim of malpractice in the issuance of
infringement opinion was barred by statute of limitations), aff'd, 1992 WL 356039
(Ill. Dec. 4, 1992); Luk Lamellen u. Kupplungsbau GmbH v. Lerner, 562 N.Y.S.2d
134, 135 (App. Div. 1990) (refusing to disqualify plaintiff's attorney in a suit involv-
ing claim of incompetent patent application prosecution by the defendant, even
though defendant planned to call the attorney as its witness at trial); American
Medical Elecs., Inc., v. Korn, 819 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ
denied) (holding client's claim of malpractice arising from the issuance of an in-
fringement opinion was barred by statute of limitations).
99. See MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 76, § 454, at 526 ([V]ery few malpractice
cases involve technical difficulties in patent work, but rather concern breaches of
fiduciary obligations and errors in litigation.").
100. One early discussion of patent law malpractice concluded that "[ilt is a
credit to the profession that there have been so few actions against patent attor-
neys." B. Joan Holdridge, Malpractice of Patent Attorneys, 7 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV.
345, 345 (1958).
101. MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 76, § 454, at 526.
102. See Coolley, supra note 96, at 266.
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method with the patented invention."° This could include, for
example, proof that the attorney rendering the opinion "re-
quest[ed] appropriate experimental data to resolve technical
issues."" When such an opinion is delivered, it is reasonable
for the client to rely on it if the "attorney is a qualified patent
attorney who has been monitoring the relevant field for several
years, and who relies on significant scientifically based objective
factors in justifying the conclusions reached."' The infringe-
ment opinion doctrine thereby induces clients to ensure the
competency of their patent attorneys' opinions and to avoid
having their attorneys address unresolved technical questions
without the benefit of reliable scientific data. The doctrine also
clearly alerts patent attorneys to the standard of competence
that they might face in malpractice claims if they delve into
practicing science in addition to law.
Although environmental law contains no direct corollary to
patent law's infringement opinion doctrine, enforcement provi-
sions of environmental statutes often require that penalties
assessed for violations of environmental regulations and orders
be based on factors such as "the violator's ... good faith efforts
to comply" 6 and whether there was "sufficient cause" to dis-
obey an order.0 7 It would be difficult for parties to take ad-
vantage of those ameliorating criteria based on reliance on an
attorney's opinion when the opinion reaches scientific conclu-
sions that are obviously outside the attorney's expertise, or
when the attorney reaches legal conclusions by relying on scien-
tific data that plainly lack detail and objectivity.
Hence, though perhaps not as liberally as patent law, envi-
ronmental law does incorporate some incentives for clients to
ensure that their attorneys' opinions regarding compliance sta-
tus do not commit either of those two faults. Moreover, when
attorneys render advice on a client's environmental compliance
status, courts likely would find it unreasonable that an opinion
that commits either of these errors be considered competent
under malpractice law. Courts may conclude that it makes
considerable sense, therefore, for environmental law to import
the "competence" standard of patent law's infringement opinion
doctrine as a benchmark of competence in environmental law
103. See id.
104. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1278, 1310
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
105. Cooley, supra note 96, at 265.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988).
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with regard to an environmental law attorney's assessment of
technical and scientific issues and information.
3. Securities Law-You Pay when You Play with High
Stakes and the Public Interest. Perhaps no field of legal practice
combines high client liability exposure and the goal of protec-
tion of the public interest like securities law. Those factors
heighten malpractice concerns. Commentators have observed
that for "securities lawyers, the liability risks and concomitant
monetary exposure are magnified. Losses suffered by clients,
investors, and other affected parties in matters that called for
corporate counsel's expertise often total millions of dollars.""'8
In particular, the potential for liability to nonclients in secu-
rities law parallels the concern of environmental lawyers, who
often provide opinions as to environmental compliance that may
be relied upon by nonclients or may lead a client to take ac-
tions contrary to environmental protection policies. The fact
that some courts have expanded the universe of parties to
which securities lawyers' are liable in malpractice to include
nonclients in certain circumstances does not bode well for envi-
ronmental attorneys.
Attorney liability to nonclients often has been implicated in
the context of an attorney's drafting of a will in a way that
impairs the interests of an intended beneficiary of the will.1"9
In such circumstances, courts have allowed the third-party ben-
eficiary to sue the attorney for malpractice."' The third-party
108. Darrel A. Rice & Marc I. Steinberg, Legal Opinions in Securities Transac-
tions, 16 J. CORP. L. 375, 387 (1991).
109. See, e.g., Rathblott v. Levin, 697 F. Supp. 817, 818 (D.N.J. 1988) (alleging
that attorney's negligence in drafting the deceased husband's will caused the widow
to unnecessarily expend estate assets in defense of the will's execution).
110. See, e.g., id. at 820. Other courts have pronounced general standards gov-
erning malpractice liability to nonclients, even outside of the wills context: "Itor a
nonclient to succeed in a negligence action against an attorney, he must prove that
the primary purpose and intent of the attorney-client relationship itself was to bene-
fit or influence the third party." Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (111.
1982); see also DENNIS J. HORAN & GEORGE W. SPELLMIRE, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE:
PREVENTION AND DEFENSE § 2-1 to -4 (1987) (discussing the Pelham rule and its ap-
plication). The scope of attorney liability to nonclients also arises in the context of
"entity representations" when the attorney allegiance might be split between the
corporate entity, managers, stockholders, and investors. See Nancy J. Moore, Expand-
ing Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Rela-
tionship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C.
L. REV. 659, 663 (1994). Moreover, courts in other practice fields have begun to
question and relax the requirement that practitioners are liable only to those enjoy-
ing privity with the practitioner as a client. See James Podgers, Third-Party Prob-
lems, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 64, 65 ("Strict adherence to privity between lawyers
and their clients is a 'vestige of a rule abolished for everyone else .... -'" (quoting
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.)). The American Law Institute is currently reformulating its
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beneficiary theory of recovery has taken root in securities
law-principally state securities law"--as a means of allow-
ing investors to sue a securities issuer's attorney who negligent-
ly drafts a legal opinion that the securities laws contemplate as
a reliable source of information for the investing public." The
rationale for allowing such recovery is simply that in situations
when
the client, with the attorney's knowledge, intends to confer the
benefit of a legally enforceable opinion upon a specified third
party, ... [the] opinion letter may be viewed as analogous to
a three-party contract in which the attorney is in the best
position to evaluate and guard against the risks of issuing an
opinion letter on which an identifiable third party... will re-
ly. 13
In such circumstances, many courts have warned that attorney
"liability for negligent misstatements to one not in contractual
privity may attach where the statement is made for the princi-
ple purpose of having it relied upon by such person, and where
its benefit to the party authorizing the statement stems pre-
cisely from such reliance by the third party.""" Indeed, the
California Supreme Court has refined that principle to a six-
factor balancing test for noncients dependent on consideration
of:
1. the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff;
2. the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
3. the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury;
4. the closeness of the connection between defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered;
position on attorney liability to nonclients in its Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers. See id.
ill. See Edward F. Donohue & Barry K. Tagawa, Current Trends in Liability
Claims Against Securities Attorneys, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REP. 1, 15 (1990).
112. Although federal securities law also provides fertile ground for holding
attorneys liable to nonclients, such liability had derived traditionally from an
attorney's direct malfeasance, such as misrepresentation and fraud, or from participa-
tion in aiding the client in such malfeasance, rather than from committing substan-
tive legal errors. See e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 487 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 613 (1994); Donohue & Tagawa, supra note 111, at 15-
16. For comprehensive discussions of the liabilities attorneys face under federal secu-
rities laws, see generally HORAN & SPELLMIRE, supra note 110, chs. 5-7, and Rice &
Steinberg, supra note 108, at 405-10.
113. Rice & Steinberg, supra note 108, at 393-94.
114. Vereins-Und Westbank, AG v. Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704, 709 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
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5. the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
and
6. the policy of preventing future harm."'
The predominant factor under the California balancing test
involves whether the purpose of the attorney's services is to
benefit the plaintiff,1 6 and thus the scope of liability, for the
most part, has been narrowly confined to plaintiffs who are
"supplied with the attorney's advice with the attorney's knowl-
edge and with the intent that they rely on it to confer a benefit
upon the client.""7 However, some courts have gone farther in
the securities context, albeit most often against accountants and
professionals other than lawyers, by allowing any reasonably
foreseeable injured third-party investor to recover."'
Strong parallels exist between securities and environmental
law with regard to nonclient beneficiaries, suggesting that
courts might be influenced by the prevalent tests in securities
law when fashioning malpractice standards for environmental
115. Goodman v. Kennedy, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1976); Biakanja v. Irving,
320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958); see also MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 76, § 7.11 (de-
scribing the California test as the "modern trend" and citing cases from 20 states
adopting it); Donohue & Tagawa, supra note 111, at 15 (noting that, as of 1990, six
states had rejected imposition of securities attorney malpractice liability to nonclients
and seven states had endorsed such liability using the California balancing test or a
variant thereof).
116. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 76, § 7.11, at 384. While initially referring to
the first factor as "the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff," the court later recharacterized this factor as the "'end or aim'" of the
transaction. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19. Some decisions have replaced the fifth factor,
moral blame, with a factor that seeks to determine the extent to which imposing
liability would create "an undue burden on the legal profession." MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 76, § 7.9, at 376.
117. Koehler v. Pulvers, 606 F. Supp. 164, 173 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
118. See, e.g., Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145, 155 (N.J. 1983)
(finding accountant auditors could reasonably foresee that their clients would use
audited financial statements in furtherance of their business); Zendell v. Newport Oil
Corp., 544 A.2d 878, 881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (applying the Rosenblum
principle to allow securities purchasers to sue lawyers who assisted in a fraudulent
initial public offering); see also Rice & Steinberg, supra note 108, at 399-401 (high-
lighting the "reasonably foreseeable" standard in securities malpractice law and dis-
cussing its application in case law). But cf. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994) (finding that a cause
of action for aiding and abetting under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act-often used against lawyers and accountants-does not exist). The expanded
scope of liability in securities practice poses the additional dilemma of the duty that
attorneys may owe to the investing public to investigate their clients. For example,
if a client engages an attorney to supply opinions based on information supplied by
the client, the attorney may feel compelled to investigate the accuracy of the client's
information in order to respond to the duty owed to nonclients, thereby possibly im-
pairing the client's interests. However, courts have not extended the duty to
nonclients that far as of yet. See Donohue & Tagawa, supra note 111, at 16.
208
HeinOnline  -- 33 Hous. L. Rev. 208 1996-1997
1996] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MALPRACTICE
law. For example, very often an environmental attorney is
called upon to assess the compliance status of a particular
facility or property with full knowledge that the client intends
to use the lawyer's opinions to induce third parties to buy the
facility or property." Indeed, often buyer and seller will
agree explicitly in the purchase contract that the seller will
commission and provide such reports.' Moreover, environ-
mental compliance opinions rely heavily on information supplied
by the client and involve analysis of complex legal and factual
issues that even a sophisticated purchaser would not reasonably
be capable of conducting alone. Therefore, courts may find those
parallels to securities law sufficiently strong to import into
environmental law the balancing test used in securities law
when determining the malpractice liability of attorneys to
nonclients for substantive legal errors made in legal opin-
ions.'"
B. Suggested Standards of Malpractice in Environmental Law
The final step in the process of defining malpractice stan-
dards for environmental law is to transfer those lessons learned
from similar practice areas that are most appropriate when
applied to environmental practice. Four main principles come
out of that funnel as being sensible guidelines for environmen-
tal law attorneys and their clients to bear in mind when doing
business together.
Principle 1: An attorney providing advice and representation
dealing with the substance and procedure of a particular issue
in environmental law will be expected to exercise the degree of
119. See generally RICHARD H. MAYS, ENVIRON.NTAL LWS: ImPACr ON BUSI-
NESS TRANSACTIONS 179-239 (1992) (providing sample questionnaires and contracts
that seek to illuminate and address environmental issues that could lurk in a real
estate transaction).
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Liquid Air Corp. v. Ideal Gas Prods., Inc., No. A-2430-92T5 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. June 1, 1994) (on file with the Houston Law Review). In Liquid
Air, the purchaser of a contaminated property sued the seller's attorneys, alleging
that an opinion letter the attorneys rendered to the seller, and which the seller
delivered to the purchaser, inaccurately stated that the sale complied with all appli-
cable laws. See id. at 2-3. In fact, the sale violated a New Jersey statute governing
transfer of contaminated property, and the attorneys confessed total ignorance of the
existence of the statute. Id The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision
that the attorneys could not be guilty of malpractice because of a lack of privity be-
tween them and the purchaser, observing that generally '[i]f a professional negli-
gently gives advice to a client causing the client to take action that foreseeably will
injure a third party, the professional may be liable to that third party." Id. at 16.
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skill and knowledge possessed by those attorneys who practice in
the specific sub-specialty of environmental law within which that
issue arises.
The descriptions of specialization found in malpractice juris-
prudence usually are devoted to broad practice fields such as
tax, patent, or securities law. The reality of the extreme degree
of sub-specialization within environmental law, however, re-
quires that malpractice law adopt not simply a specialist stan-
dard, but rather one that explicitly recognizes the utility of sub-
specialization within the field. Clients usually will not appreci-
ate, for example, that an attorney whose practice has focused
on CERCLA litigation is ill equipped to provide advice regard-
ing compliance with the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, the mal-
practice standard should alert attorneys that they will be mea-
sured against an "ordinary" member of the rather specialized
cadre of experts who practice in the same particular subsets of
environmental law. The use of specialization standards is now
firmly established in malpractice jurisprudence. Environmental
law presents the circumstances for extending these principles to
the realm of sub-specialization.
Principle 2: An attorney providing advice and representation
that requires the attorney to exercise judgment regarding un-
settled or ambiguous questions of the substance or procedure of
environmental law will not be held liable for errors in such
judgment provided that: (1) the judgment was based on research
and analysis of the applicable legal authorities commensurate
with the standard of skill and knowledge described in Principle
1; (2) the judgment was reasonable in light of the client's inter-
ests, and the client's instructions, and other relevant circum-
stances; (3) the attorney made reasonable efforts to confirm
whether the judgment was consistent with reasonably accessible
policies and interpretations of any appropriate authority respon-
sible for implementing the applicable law; and (4) the attorney
fully informed the client regarding the unsettled or ambiguous
nature of the applicable law, the alternative courses of action
available to the client, and risks to the client inherent in follow-
ing the attorney's judgment.
Given the abundance of unsettled and ambiguous issues in
environmental law, it is reasonable to extend to attorneys in
that field the same degree of "reasonable judgment" comfort
given to attorneys in other specialty practices. This proposed
malpractice standard increases the burden on environmental
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attorneys, however, by explicitly recognizing the "invisible law"
factor of environmental practice created by the plethora of in-
formal agency policies and interpretations and the duty of at-
torneys to identify and evaluate those sources in the process of
formulating their conclusions concerning environmental law is-
sues. The reality of environmental practice is that the environ-
mental law sub-specialists who represent the benchmarks of
skill and knowledge under Principle 1 are keenly aware of the
presence of the informal dimension of environmental law, the
ways to uncover it, and the need to incorporate its details when
analyzing environmental law issues. To be sure, the proposal
acknowledges that those informal sources usually are not bind-
ing, and that the attorney's judgment thus need not conform
necessarily to an agency's informal policies and interpretations
in order to be reasonable. The proposed standard also acknowl-
edges that it may not be reasonable, because of the client's
time or budget constraints or the reticence of an agency to
make its positions accessible, for an attorney to be expected to
discover all potentially relevant informal authorities. With these
limitations in mind, however, explicitly comparing an attorney's
judgment against an agency's position under the malpractice
standard is sensible and justified as a way of helping to ensure
that attorneys will detect and inform their clients of any dis-
parity between the attorney's and the agency's respective posi-
tions.
Principle 3: An attorney providing advice and representation on
an issue of environmental law will not be liable for errors in the
attorney's judgment regarding the resolution of the issue that are
caused by the attorney's incorrect application of the technical
information provided that: (1) the attorney has compiled, either
by requesting it from the client or by commissioning experts, a
body of technical information that is relevant to the legal issue
in question and of adequate depth and detail to permit a judg-
ment regarding the resolution of the issue; (2) the attorney is
reasonable in concluding that the information was generated
through scientifically competent and objective methods; (3) the
attorney relies exclusively upon the whole body of the informa-
tion for reaching a judgment on the legal issue; and (4) the
attorney's judgment was reasonable within the meaning of Prin-
ciple 2.
The difficulties environmental attorneys face when dealing
with technical information so closely mirrors difficulties in pat-
ent law that no sound policy reason exists for departing from
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the "competence" standard used in patent law for determining
whether a patent infringer may use an attorney infringement
opinion as evidence of good faith. Although the patent standard
has not surfaced as a malpractice criterion for that field of
practice, it very likely would be adopted were the question of
technical judgment to become dispositive in a patent malprac-
tice case. The proposed standard thus insulates an attorney
against malpractice liability when technical issues are involved,
provided the attorney is divorced from the process of generating
the data and is justified in concluding that the data generated
from the process are relevant, objective, and adequate to resolve
the legal issue. If the attorney's judgment is mistaken, it would
be because either the body of technical information was flawed
or the attorney applied it to the legal issue incorrectly; howev-
er, if in such circumstances the attorney can demonstrate that
all the parameters of Principles 1-3 are satisfied, a client
should not be able to hold the attorney liable.
Principle 4: An attorney providing advice and representation on
matters of environmental law is liable for injuries caused by the
attorney's failure to satisfy Principles 1-3 only to persons: (1)
with whom the attorney has established an attorney-client rela-
tionship regarding such matters; and (2) who the attorney knew
or reasonably should have foreseen, based on the client's direct
and explicit instructions to the attorney, would rely on the
attorney's advice and representation for the direct benefit of the
attorney's client and could be injured by substantive errors
therein.
Environmental attorneys, particularly those involved in
transactional matters, cannot reasonably claim ignorance of the
fact that clients often commission an attorney's opinion on envi-
ronmental law matters for purposes of inducing third-party
behavior. Indeed, the potential injuries to the third parties
occasioned by an erroneous opinion on an issue of
environmental law can be dramatic. On the other hand, envi-
ronmental law does not contain the highly formalized provisions
regarding attorney opinions found in securities laws or the
highly formalized expressions of intended third-party beneficiary
effects found in estate planning practice. Often times an attor-
ney is not told why the client is requesting an opinion about
the environmental compliance of a certain facility when the rea-
sons are not otherwise apparent. It is appropriate, therefore, to
recognize that in some circumstances attorney malpractice lia-
bility may extend beyond the narrow confines of the attorney-
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client relationship. However, liability should be limited in accor-
dance with an attorney's understanding of the circumstances as
related by the client. Thus, for example, if the seller of an in-
dustrial facility agrees to provide the buyer an analysis of the
environmental compliance status of the facility and informs an
attorney that the attorney is being retained to prepare the
analysis for that purpose, the attorney's potential malpractice
exposure should extend to the client and the purchaser. Mal-
practice exposure should not extend, however, to the
purchaser's tenant, the purchaser's subsequent purchaser, work-
ers in the facility, or to other parties not squarely within the
original client's intended beneficiary target zone.
V. CONCLUSION
If the number of claims and cases is any indication, envi-
ronmental law practitioners have not committed many instances
of malpractice. Indeed, as a group they may be the least likely
among attorneys to wind up facing a malpractice claim. All the
chemistry is in play, however, to lead to an explosion of mal-
practice claims in environmental law, even if the attorneys in
that field continue to practice as they have. Moreover, the fac-
tors at play in environmental law-complexity, changeability,
and technologically difficult subject matters-show no signs of
relaxing. The writing is on the wall; environmental attorneys
must exercise extreme caution and deliberation in their deal-
ings.
Perhaps, however, the consternation felt in the community
of environmental attorneys is unnecessary. Other specialized
practice areas have existed for decades without collapse under
the weight of malpractice pressures. This Article has shown
how malpractice law applicable in several practice areas has
balanced the needs of clients with the pressures on attorneys to
exercise competently professional judgment in a complex set-
ting. The standards that have evolved in malpractice jurispru-
dence acknowledge the expertise necessary to practice compe-
tently in those fields, but provide latitude to attorneys when
they grapple with unsettled legal issues and complex technical
issues. In each case, a balance has been struck between the
clients' reasonable expectations and the attorneys' reasonable
protections.
That sense of balance belongs in environmental law as
well. By adapting the malpractice standards that have evolved
in fields such as tax, patent, and securities law to environmen-
tal law, malpractice jurisprudence would allow yet another area
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of specialization to develop without having attorneys live in fear
and doubt as to what measures of skill, knowledge, and compe-
tence will apply to them. Although the standards proposed in
this Article are not yet in place, the prediction that they will be
used should the explosion of environmental law malpractice
claims ever occur is based on precedent from analogous fields of
practice. Indeed, if environmental attorneys were to begin living
by those standards now, the malpractice explosion in environ-
mental law may never occur. Let's hope so!
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